Civil Procedure—The End of the Class Action in Multi-Taxpayer Litigation Seeking Refunds of State Taxes. ACW Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997). by Nichols, Joey
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 7 
1998 
Civil Procedure—The End of the Class Action in Multi-Taxpayer 
Litigation Seeking Refunds of State Taxes. ACW Inc. v. Weiss, 329 
Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997). 
Joey Nichols 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Taxation-State and Local Commons, and the Tax Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joey Nichols, Civil Procedure—The End of the Class Action in Multi-Taxpayer Litigation Seeking Refunds 
of State Taxes. ACW Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997)., 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
151 (1998). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE-THE END OF THE CLASS ACTION IN MULTI-
TAXPAYER LITIGATION SEEKING REFUNDS OF STATE TAXES. ACWINc. V.
WEiss, 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION
In A CW, Inc. v. Weiss,' the Arkansas Supreme Court revisited the issue of
whether a class action lawsuit can be used by taxpayers to seek a refund of an
improperly collected tax.2 The case weighs the policy concerns in favor of
taxpayer class action suits against the state's right to protection against lawsuits
in its own courts under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' While the court
has addressed this problem previously, this case signals a fundamental break
from past precedents." After the decision in ACW, it will be almost impossible
to use a class action to sue the State of Arkansas to gain a tax refund.
This note begins Part II with a brief description of the relevant facts of
ACW, Inc. v. Weiss. Part M explores the development of the case law leading
up to this decision. Part IV of the note is devoted to an analysis of the court's
reasoning in the majority and the dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V discusses
the significance and possible future ramifications of this decision.
II. FACTS
The Arkansas legislature passed a new corporate taxing scale6 during the
1991 session in response to an emergency need for additional revenue.7 The
new tax tables caused those corporations with gross income of more than
$100,000 to pay a greater percentage of the tax than those corporations with
total income of less than $100,000.8
1. 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 314, 947 S.W.2d at 776.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Act of Apr. 9, 1991, No. 1052, 1991 Ark. Acts 3280 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 26-51-205 (Michie 1992)). Act 1052 establishes graduated corporate tax rates for income less
than $100,000 and a flat rate of 6.5 % on all income in excess of $100,000. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 26-51-205 (Michie 1992).
7. See ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 307, 947 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1997). "[T]he
General Assembly... [determined]... that additional funds were necessary to provide higher
quality education programs which are accessible by all segments of the population . . .- id.
8. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-205 (Michie 1992).
(a) Every corporation organized under the laws of this state shall pay annually
an income tax with respect to carrying on or doing business on the entire net income
of the corporation.... received by such corporation during the income year, on the
following basis:
(1) On the first $3000 of net income or any part thereof ............... I%
On the second $3000 of net income or any part thereof .......... 2%
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The plaintiffs were all corporations that reported taxable income in excess
of $100,000.9 After first seeking refunds individually, the plaintiffs filed a
class action claim against the state seeking a refund of the overpaid taxes on the
first $100,000 of taxable income.10 These corporations brought suit against the
directors of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration."
Plaintiffs structured their claim as a class action lawsuit so as to include all
others whom the tax affected adversely."
The Pulaski County Chancery Court originally heard the case.13 The
chancery court upheld the class certification the plaintiffs established; 4
however, the court agreed with the defendants in interpreting the tax as
imposing a flat rate on all income for those corporations with greater than
$100,000 in income. 5 The plaintiffs appealed the chancery court's decision to
the Arkansas Supreme Court.'6 Defendants responded by cross-appealing the
decision of the chancery court to certify the class action, arguing that the
On the next $5000 of net income or any part thereof.............. 3%
On the next $14,000 of net income or any part thereof. ........... 5%
On the next $75,000 of net income or any part thereof, but
not exceeding $100,000 ..................................... 6%
(2) On net income exceeding $100,000, a flat rate of six and one-half (6 Y2%)
percent shall be applied to the entire net income.
Id.
9. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 305, 947 S.W.2d at 771. The named parties in the certified
class of plaintiffs were ACW, Inc., Phillips Development Company, and United Wholesale
Florists, Inc. See id.
10. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 302, 947 S.W.2d at 770. The named plaintiffs filed the class
action claim in chancery court after they had exhausted all of their administrative remedies
available in seeking a tax refund. See id. at 306, 947 S.W.2d at 771.
11. See id. at 302, 947 S.W.2d at 770. The named defendants were Richard Weiss,
Director of the Department of Finance and Administration, and John Theis, Assistant
Commissioner for Policy and Legal. See Brief for Appellees at 1, ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329
Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997) (No. 96-00894).
12. SeeACW, 329 Ark. at 302, 947 S.W.2d at 770.
13. See id. Judge Ellen B. Brantley of the Fifth Division of the Pulaski County Chancery
Court originally heard the case. See Appellant's Reply Brief, ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark.
302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997) (No. 96-00894).
14. SeeACW, 329 Ark. at 306, 947 S.W.2d at 771.
15. See id. The court determined that the new tax met the constitutional requirements of
Article V, section 38 of the Arkansas Constitution, which requires that the passage of a tax act
be in response to an emergency need for funds. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 38 (1992). The
ambiguity in the Act's wording was best resolved in favor of the Commissioner of the
Department of Finance and Administration's interpretation. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 306, 947
S.W.2d at 772. The court's ruling required those corporations with over $100,000 of taxable
income to pay 6.5% in state income tax on all of their income. See id.
16. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 306, 947 S.W.2d at 772. Appellants contended that (I) no
emergency existed under ARK. CONST. art. V, section 38 giving the General Assembly the right
to enact the tax; (2) the Act should be interpreted to apply the graduated tax rates to the first
$100,000 or the Act is ambiguous; (3) the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause; (4) the Act
results in a confiscatory tax. See id.
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doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the state from taxpayer suits of this
nature. 7 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's finding
that the tax met the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution, 8 but reversed
the chancery court's interpretation of the statute in favor of the taxpayers. 9
The court also found that the chancery court erred in certifying the class, and
reversed the certification.2°
III. BACKGROUND
Arkansas courts have struggled with the conflict created between the
policy reasons for allowing taxpayer class action suits and the State's right to
sovereign immunity.2' Arkansas is not alone in having tremendous difficulty
creating a reasonable solution to this problem.22 Courts across the country
disagree about whether and under what circumstances taxpayers may use a
class action lawsuit in seeking a tax refund.' Many states, including Arkansas,
have statutory procedures that must be followed by the taxpayer in order to
obtain a tax refund.24 Most of these statutes do not mention whether class
action claims are permitted. 25 Other states will allow class action suits by
taxpayers when common legal questions are involved and when the relief
sought is appropriate to all members.26 The remainder of this section will
review Arkansas case law dealing with these issues and summarize the current
status of the law in other jurisdictions.
17. See Appellee's Brief at 27, ACW(No. 96-00894).
18. SeeACW, 329 Ark. at 310, 947 S.W.2d at 774.
19. See id. at 314, 947 S.W.2d at 776. The Court interpreted the tax in favor of the
corporate taxpayers in finding that the tax imposed graduated rates on the first $100,000 of
income for all corporations. See id. at 315, 947 S.W.2d at 776.
20. See id. at 315, 947 S.W.2d at 776.
21. See, e.g., Pledger v. Bosnick, 306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d 286 (1991) (upholding a class
certification order by the chancery court for a group of taxpayers seeking a refund); State Dep't
of Fin. & Admin. v. Staton, 325 Ark. 341, 942 S.W.2d 804 (1996) (reversing the chancery
court's certification of a class of taxpayers seeking refund of a state sales tax); State Dep't of
Fin. & Admin. v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495, 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996) (reversing the lower court's
certification of a class of taxpayers seeking a tax refund).
22. See Philip M. Tatarowicz, Right to a Refund for Unconstitutionally Discriminatory
State Taxes and Other Controversial State Tax Issues Under the Commerce Clause, 41 TAX
LAW. 103, 123 (1987).
23. See id.
24. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-507(e)(2)(A) (Michie 1992).
25. See id.
26. See 4 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Plead § 272 (4th ed. 1997). See also
Thorn v. Jefferson County, 375 So. 2d 780 (Ala. 1979); Santa Barbara Optical Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 47 Cal. App. 3d 244 (1975); Ware v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 567 P.2d 423
(Idaho 1977); Fiorito v. Jones, 236 N.E.2d 698 (I11. 1968).
19981
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A. Arkansas' Application of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in
Taxpayer Class Action Suits
This section of the note will first examine the requirements that must be
followed to file for a tax refund under Arkansas law. The next part of this
section will be devoted to an outline of the general requirements that must be
established in order to maintain a class action lawsuit in Arkansas. The last
portion of this section will provide a historical outline of the case law in
Arkansas dealing with the certification of taxpayer class action suits against the
state.
1. Arkansas Tax Refund Procedure
The State of Arkansas has established statutory procedures citizens must
follow in order to seek a refund of improperly collected taxes." A detailed
description of these procedures is laid out in section 26-18-507 of the Arkansas
Code.2 8 If the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration either
denies a refund request or fails to respond within six months, the taxpayer may
file suit to obtain the refund.29 By following these procedures, the taxpayer has
nullified the defense of sovereign immunity. 30 Uncertainty as to how the courts
should treat a case arises when only the named plaintiffs in a class action
lawsuit actually follow the statutory refund procedures.3 The issue is whether
the court should treat this adherence to the law by the named plaintiffs as
waiving the State's sovereign immunity for the entire class of plaintiffs or only
for those that followed the statutory requirements.
2. Requirements for Maintaining a Class Action Suit in Arkansas
The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure lay out the requirements for
forming a class action in Rule 23.32 This rule was not made part of the
Arkansas Rules until 1979.33 Since its enaction, the courts in Arkansas have
27. See ARK. CODE ANN: § 26-18-507 (e)(2)(A) (Michie 1992).
28. See id.
29. See id. The taxpayer may seek judicial relief after a denial of the refund claim by the
director or the director's failure to issue a written decision within a period of six months after
the claim has been filed. See id. Any written decision of the director on a refund suit becomes
final and not subject to judicial relief 91 days after issued. See id.
30. See Staton, 325 Ark. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 805.
31. See id. at 345, 942 S.W.2d at 808.
32. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 23.
33. See Kenneth S. Gould, New Wine In An Old Bottle-Arkansas's Liberalized Class
Action Procedure-A Boon to the Consumer Class Action, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 2
(1994). The Arkansas class action procedure used prior to 1979 was derived directly from the
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increasingly liberalized their interpretation of the rule so that the class action
format can now be used in many new ways." Currently, there are four general
requirements for forming a class action.35 First, the class of parties must be so
numerous that normal joinder of all members would not be practicable.36
Second, there must be questions of law or fact that are common to all members
of the class.37 Third, the claims and defenses of the representative parties must
be typical of those of the rest of the class. 38 Finally, the representative parties
and their counsel must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 39
Once the four requirements discussed above have been met, certification
is not automatic.4 The court still has some discretion in deciding whether to
grant class certification; however, if the court feels that the questions of law or
fact that are common to all members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, it should grant the class
certification." Courts in Arkansas have been some of the most generous in the
country in interpreting Rule 23 generously to allow the certification of classes
in a variety of cases.42
3. History ofArkansas Case Law
The Arkansas Supreme Court's first opportunity to test the limits of the
State's sovereign immunity against taxpayer suits came in 1991 with Pledger
v. Bosnick43 In Bosnick, a group of retirees brought a class action suit against
the State of Arkansas, charging that the state income tax favored retired state
common law doctrine of virtual representation developed in equity. See id.
34. See id. at 1; International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295
Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988) (holding that the presence of individual remedies amongst the
members of the class would not prevent the court from using the class action to resolve those
issues common to the class such as defendant's liability); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v.
Morris, 294 Ark. 496, 744 S.W.2d 709 (1988) (allowing the use of a class action despite the
fact that individual questions particular to each case could later cause the case to split into a
number of individual suits).
35. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
36. See id.
37. See id. This requirement was changed significantly with the addition of the new Rule
23 in 1979. See Gould, supra note 33, at 24. The old language required that the party establish
that there were "common questions of law and fact" rather than the current language requiring
a "common question of law or fact." See Gould, supra note 33, at 24. This allowed the use of
the class action in many cases that otherwise would not meet the requirements. See Gould,
supra note 33, at 24.
38. See ARK. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
39. See id.
40. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
41. See id.
42. See Gould, supra note 33, at 15.
43. 306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d 286 (1991).
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employees over all other retirees who did not work for the state and was
therefore unconstitutional." The lower court certified the class of taxpayers
and ruled in their favor on the substantive issues of the lawsuit. 45 On appeal,
the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision to certify the
class of taxpayers despite the fact that few of the members of the class had
followed the statutory refund requirements." Rather than strictly construe the
refund requirements of section 26-18-507 of the Arkansas Code, the court
looked to the general requirements for bringing a class action suit, as well as
the ways other states had treated these issues. 47 While the court wrote little as
to its analysis, it is clear that it relied on the general requirements for bringing
a class action suit in Arkansas and found that the plaintiffs had met these
requirements.
48
The Arkansas Supreme Court revisited the issues raised by Bosnick again
in 1996 in State Department of Finance and Administration v. Staton.49 Staton
was a class action suit brought on behalf of taxpayers to recover improperly
collected taxes on the sale of automobiles.5 When the Arkansas Supreme
Court originally heard the case, the court followed the reasoning and precedent
established by Bosnick and allowed the certification of the class of taxpayers
despite the fact that many of the class members had not filed refund claims."'
Remarkably, after granting the State's Motion for Rehearing in the Staton case,
44. See id. at 47, 811 S.W.2d at 288. Ark. Code Ann. section 26-51-307 provided a full
exemption from state income tax for all income received by Arkansas Public Employees,
Teachers, State Police, and Highway Employees Retirement Systems while only allowing an
exemption for the first $6000 of income for all others. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-307
(Michie 1992). While relief in Bosnick was sought under the taxpayer refund statute, Ark. Code
Ann. section 26-18-507, the Arkansas Constitution also contains a provision governing relief
to taxpayers suing to prevent the enforcement of an unconstitutional tax. See ARK. CONST. art.
16, § 13.
45. See Bosnick, 306 Ark. at 47, 811 S.W.2d at 288.
46. See id. at 57, 811 S.W.2d at 293.
47. See id. at 56, 811 S.W.2d at 293. As authority for its decision to uphold the class
certification, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited the following cases, all of which allowed
certification of a class of taxpayers: Thorn v. Jefferson County, 375 So. 2d 780 (Ala. 1979);
Santa Barbara Optical Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 47 Cal. App. 3d 244 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Ware v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 567 P.2d 423 (Idaho 1977); Fiorito v. Jones, 236
N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 1968). See id.
48. See Bosnick, 306 Ark. at 57, 811 S.W.2d at 293.
49. 325 Ark. 341, 942 S.W.2d 804 (1996).
50. See id. at 343, 942 S.W.2d at 804. Taxpayers claimed that the payment of state sales
tax on the extended service contract purchased along with an automobile was unconstitutional.
See id. They further argued that the language of the sales tax statute, section 26-52-301 of the
Arkansas Code, provided no basis for the taxation of extended service contracts. See id.
51. Seeid.at343,942S.W.2dat807.
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the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision and ruled against the
certification of the class of taxpayers. 2
The majority opinion in Staton places great importance on the principles
of strict construction. 3 The court stated that the State's sovereign immunity
was a defense that should be enforced rigidly and only waived in very limited
circumstances.14  The court cited other prior case law establishing the
majority's view that when a statute authorizes a means of protest, that method
of protest is meant to apply individually to all plaintiffs." The majority
reasoned that a strict construction of the sovereign immunity waiver was
necessary because a statutory refund procedure puts the government on notice
that it may be required to refund those taxes, so that it can make appropriate
allowances. 56 Otherwise, tax revenues that may have to be paid back to all
members of the class of taxpayers later would be allocated to the general
unrestricted revenues of the government, rather than a fund set aside for those
taxpayers who pay the tax under protest.
5 7
Along with the notice requirements discussed above, the majority in
Staton also looked back to Pledger v. Bosnick as further precedent for not
allowing the use of a taxpayer class action suit.58 In Bosnick, the State of
Arkansas never brought up the defense of sovereign immunity in attempting
to overturn the certification of the class of taxpayers. 59 The Staton court
reasoned that since Bosnick did not address the issue of sovereign immunity in
52. See Dierdre White, Arkansas Supreme Court Decertifies Class But Rules Extended
Service Warranties Not Taxable; Only One Person Entitled To Refund, West's Legal News,
1996 WL 636616 (1996). The original opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court in this case,
which was published in the advance sheets at 934 S.W.2d 478, was withdrawn from the bound
volume and will be republished with an appendix to Justice Newbern's dissenting opinion. See
id.
53. See Staton, 325 Ark. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 807.
54. See id. (citing Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d
847 (1993)).
55. See id. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 806. "When recovery is authorized by statute upon
payment 'under protest,' we literally require a payment 'under protest."' Id. at 345, 942 S.W.2d
at 806 (citing Hercules Inc. v. Pledger, 319 Ark. 702, 894 S.W.2d 576 (1995)).
56. See Staton, 325 Ark. at 345, 942 S.W.2d at 806. "If we were to allow refunds for
taxes voluntarily paid in previous years, it would jeopardize current and future governmental
operations because current and future funds might be necessary for the refund." Id. (citing
Mertz v. Pappas, 320 Ark. 368, 370, 896 S.W.2d 593, 594 (1995)).
57. See id. at 346, 942 S.W.2d at 807.
While a payment which is not made under protest is deposited into general revenues
and becomes available for immediate use by the state, a payment made under protest
only becomes available for the state's use after the taxpayer fails to file suit within
the one year period or after judicial determination that the deficiency assessment
was valid.
Id. (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Pledger, 319 Ark. 702, 707, 894 S.W.2d 576, 578 (1995)).
58. See id. (citing Pledger v. Bosnick, 306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d 286 (1991)).
59. See id. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 807.
1998]
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taxpayer class action suits, that decision was not controlling.' Because the
State did not waive its sovereign immunity with regard to the unnamed
plaintiffs, only Debora Staton had sought a refund properly, and the court
denied her refund claim alone.61
Despite the change in philosophy in the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision in Staton, the court is far from agreement on the issue of the waiver
of sovereign immunity.62 Three justices opposed the ruling in Staton, believing
very strongly that the majority was in error in favoring sovereign immunity
over the principles governing the use of class actions.63 Justice Brown noted
that even if the taxpayers were allowed to sue the state without first going
through the appropriate refund procedures, they would still have to prove they
were eligible for a refund after the lawsuit was finalized. 6 Justice Brown also
argued that if a taxpayer is forced to pay a tax that is found to be illegal, that
person deserves a reasonable opportunity for a refund.65 The simplest and most
efficient manner for dealing with these refund claims is in a single action rather
than requiring all of the members of the class to bring suit.66 Denial of the class
action is going to leave most taxpayers who may be owed refunds ignorant of
that fact because of lack of notice. 67 Justice Newbern saw the notice proce-
dures for class actions, governed by Rule 23(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure, as the best alternative for giving taxpayers the best possible notice
of their claim.68 Both justices stated that the class action was the only way to
treat all taxpayers equally and give all those who have paid an unconstitutional
tax a reasonable opportunity to obtain a refund.69
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Staton, 325 Ark. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 807 (Newbern, J., dissenting). See also
id. at 354, 942 S.W.2d at 814 (Brown, J., dissenting).
63. See id. (Newbern, J., dissenting). See also id. at 354, 942 S.W.2d at 814 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
64. See id. at 354, 942 S.W.2d at 815 (Brown, J., dissenting). Each class member of the
prevailing class action would still have to prove his or her claim to the State after the court
rendered a decision. See id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
65. See id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 808 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 354, 942 S.W.2d at 815 (Brown, J., dissenting).
68. See Staton, 325 Ark. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 808 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
69. See id. (Newbem, J., dissenting). See also id. at 354, 942 S.W.2d at 815 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
The effect of the majority opinion.., is to suggest that [the Department of Finance
and Administration] may sit by smugly and entertain the claims of the one or two
taxpayers who may have information about the possible illegality of the tax in
question, knowing all the while that there are thousands of others who may be owed
but with whom it will never have to reckon.
Id. at 344, 942 S.W.2d at 808 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
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B. Synopsis of the General State of the Law in Other Jurisdictions
Courts in other states are also having difficulties in establishing the
availability of class action suits by taxpayers seeking a refund of a tax they
believe to be applied incorrectly or unconstitutionally.70 This inherent conflict
between the principles governing the use of class actions and the protection
given to the state through sovereign immunity has led to a variety of different
results with no consistent analysis.7
1. Determination Based on Statutory Construction
A large number of states have tax refund procedures established by
statutes that are very similar to those in Arkansas which set out the procedural
requirements for taking any tax dispute to court.72 The majority of these
statutes give the taxpayer the right to sue and also waive the state's sovereign
immunity in its own courts, making no mention of whether the use of a class
action lawsuit is permitted.73 In interpreting the legislative intent of these
statutes, a number of courts have treated the omission of any reference to the
use of "class actions" as a sign that they are not applicable to these refund
statutes.74 Courts examined the particular wording of the statutes to see if the
refund rights given to a person, which included a group or combination acting
as a unit might be used to bring classes of plaintiffs within this definition of
person.75 This analysis of the wording of the statutes, along with concern with
protecting the state's financial interest in the potential large loss in revenues to
tax refunds, has led many courts to interpret the refund statutes to require full
compliance on the part of all taxpayers.
76
70. See Gregory A. Nowak, A Tale of Two Forums: Litigating State Taxes, 69 MIcH. B.J.
826, 828 (1990).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Henderson v. Carter, 195 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. 1972) (upholding Georgia refund
statute which requires adherence to refund procedures in order to waive sovereign immunity);
State ex rel. Sampson v. Kenny, 175 N.W.2d 5 (Neb. 1970) (upholding Nebraska's refund
statute which requires each taxpayer to file a refund claim).
73. See Sampson, 175 N.W.2d at 7.
74. See, e.g., Henderson, 195 S.E.2d at 6; Blackmon v. Georgia Indep. Oilmen's Ass'n,
198 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973); Hooks v. Comptroller of Treasury, 289 A.2d 332 (Md.
1972).
75. See, e.g., Charles v. Spradling, 524 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1975). The court determined
that the definition of "person" did not refer to a class of unrelated individuals, and thus did not
permit a representative of such a class to make a refund claim on behalf of the entire class. See
id. at 823.
76. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
1998]
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2. Determination Based on the General Principles Governing Class
Action Suits
Another approach some states have used in resolving whether a class
action claim is appropriate is to fall back on the general principles that govern
the certification of a class action group.77 Rather than apply a general statutory
analysis to cover all taxpayer suits, the court in Whaley examined each attempt
to certify a class on its own merits to see if the requirements for forming a class
action have been met.78 The court was very interested in determining whether
there is a well-defined community of interest among the members of the class.79
Other factors the courts will consider are whether the relief is appropriate
to all and whether all members of the class are pursuing a common legal
question. 80 Many taxpayer class action suits meet these requirements since all
of the members of the class are likely to be concerned with a common legal
question.8' All members of the class are also likely to be seeking the same
relief-a refund of taxes paid. 2  Courts have also used the size of the
individual claims of the class members as a factor.8 3 In cases in which the
amount in dispute for each individual plaintiff is small, it is often not
economically feasible for plaintiffs to challenge the validity of the tax in court
on their own.84 Without the availability of the class action, these taxpayers
would have no recourse.85
3. The "Test Case" Approach
Another approach that is not widely recognized is the use of a "test case"
to decide the particular tax issue, rather than the use of a class action.86
77. See Whaley v. Commonwealth, 61 S.W. 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901) (using equitable
principles of fairness and judicial economy in allowing the certification of a class of taxpayers).
78. See id. at 37.
79. See id.
80. See State ex rel. Devlin v. Dickinson, 305 So. 2d 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); See
also Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
81. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
82. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
83. See Bruce R. Braun & W. Gordon Dobie, Litigating the Yankee Tax: Application of
the Lodestar to Attorneys'Fee Awards in Common Fund Litigation, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 897,
914(1996).
84. See id. "Individuals who have small amounts at stake... will not be able to find
counsel to accept the representation [and] ... will find it economically unfeasible to pursue
such litigation individually." Id.
85. See id. The individual taxpayer's right to maintain an action at law to recover an
illegal tax is described as an inadequate and imperfect remedy in many cases. See, e.g., Whaley,
61 S.W. at 37.
86. See Nowak, supra note 70, at 827. The Attorney General would select one of the
[Vol. 21
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Proponents have argued that a "test case" would provide a more prompt and
efficient resolution of the conflict without the need for costly class action
procedures and related attorney's fees.87 Proponents of the class action format
argue that the "test case" approach fails to provide all parties with an assurance
of adequate representation as well as proper notice of all matters which affect
their rights.88
4. Prospectivity Doctrine
Another question that has come up in the area of taxpayer suits is whether
the state has a right to prospectively restrict refunds.89 States concerned with
the potentially enormous revenue losses that could be realized if a tax is
invalidated came up with a theory known as the "prospectivity doctrine" 9 to
deny these refund claims. 9' The states argue that they should only be obligated
to refund revenue that was taken in after the tax was found unconstitutional.92
The argument behind such reasoning is that great importance should be placed
on the ability of the state government to maintain financial solvency.93 This
approach, while very favorable to the state, provides the injured taxpayer with
no remedy for the state's constitutional violations.94  Presently, the
prospectivity doctrine has been applied only to those cases where the court's
decision as to the tax creates new law.95 The most recent trend has been to
severely limit the use of the prospectivity doctrine in most tax refund cases.96
many cases pending in state court at random to be tried on the merits. See Nowak, supra note
70, at 827. The other cases would be held in abeyance awaiting the decision of the test case.
See Nowak, supra note 70, at 827.
87. See Nowak, supra note 70, at 827. See also Steven Shapiro, Multitaxpayer Litigation,
43 TAx LAW. 719, 721 (1990) (providing a description of the test case approach as used in
federal multitaxpayer disputes).
88. See Nowak, supra note 70, at 827.
89. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
90. Courts created this doctrine to allow tax refunds for only the period of time after the
tax is found to be unconstitutional. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
91. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117. "[T]he prospectivity issue is essentially a
balancing of two interests, . . . the state's sovereign right to preserve its treasury and the
competing interest of taxpayers to a clear and certain remedy for constitutional violations."
Nowak, supra note 70, at 827.
92. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
93. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
94. See Tatarowicz, supra note 22, at 117.
95. See David F. Shores, Recovery of Unconstitutional Taxes: A New Approach, 12 VA.
TAX REV. 167, 187 (1992).
96. See Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?,
79 IOWAL. REV. 273, 282 (1994).
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The majority opinion in ACW Inc. v. Weiss examines in detail the
constitutional validity of Act 1052 of 1991, the appearance of ambiguity in the
wording of the statute, and the validity of the chancery court's class certifica-
tion.97 The court first looked closely at the Arkansas Constitution to determine
whether the General Assembly possessed the requisite power to enact this tax.98
The court gave great deference to the legislature in determining whether a
sufficient emergency existed to justify the passage of a new tax.99 Another
factor the court considered in determining the constitutionality of the Act was
the overwhelming presumption that statutes are constitutionally valid unless
proven otherwise.'0° Based on these premises and a close examination of the
legislature's reasoning behind the passage of the tax, the majority concluded
that the Arkansas Constitution did not preclude Act 1052.101
Another major concern the majority examined in detail was whether the
wording of Act 1052 was ambiguous.12 The court reached the same opinion
as the chancery court in determining that the statute was in fact capable of
multiple interpretations.'03 Rather than choose the most likely interpretation on
its own, the court looked back to the Act's passage to determine the drafters'
legislative intent." 4 In examining the legislative history of the tax, the majority
found persuasive evidence of Act 1052's proper interpretation.05 The court
97. SeeACW, 329 Ark. at 315, 947 S.W.2d at 776.
.98. See id. at 307, 947 S.W.2d at 773. Article V, section 38 of the Arkansas Constitution
limits the General Assembly's power to levy taxes without voter approval to those cases where
a sufficient emergency exists and the tax is approved by three-fourths of the General Assembly.
See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 38 (1992).
99. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 310, 947 S.W.2d at 774. The court determined that the
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing that no emergency existed to give
the General Assembly the authority to enact the tax. See id.
100. See id. at 310,947 S.W.2d at 774 (citing Ports Petroleum Co. v. Tucker, 323 Ark. 680,
916 S.W.2d 749 (1996)).
101. SeeACW, 329 Ark. at 310, 947 S.W.2d at 774.
102. See id. at 311,947 S.W.2d at 774. "[A] statute is ambiguous where it is open to two
or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds
might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning." Id. at 312, 947 S.W.2d at 775 (citing City
of Little Rock v. Arkansas Corp. Comm'n, 209 Ark. 18, 189 S.W.2d 382 (1945)).
103. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 312, 947 S.W.2d at 775. The court determined that the
language set forth in the second subsection of the statute when read in conjunction with the first
subsection is capable of being interpreted to require the payment of a flat 6.5% rate on all
income for corporations with income greater than $100,000 and can also be interpreted as
requiring those corporations with over $100,000 of income to pay the lower prescribed
graduated rates on the first $100,000. See id.
104. See id. at 313, 947 S.W.2d at 775.
105. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 313, 947 S.W.2d at 775. "Act 1052-Increases the corporate
income tax on corporations with net income exceeding $100,000. The new tax is a flat 6.5%
on the net taxable income that exceeds $100,000." Id. (quoting Official Biennial Budget of the
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also followed prior Arkansas precedents that gave the taxpayer the benefit of
the doubt when the express words of a statute are ambiguous. 06 The Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's decision by finding for the
taxpayers on the interpretation of the statute's ambiguous language.'l 7
After resolving the fundamental disputes as to the meaning and effect of
Act 1052, the majority addressed the State's cross-appeal on class
certification.lo In making its decision to reverse the chancery court's class
certification, the majority relied heavily on the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.'°9 As a general rule, sovereign immunity prohibits lawsuits against
the state.' 0 This rule is not absolute, however, since the law provides a number
of instances in which the State may waive its sovereign immunity."' One way
that sovereign immunity is waived is by the taxpayer's filing of a tax refund
request with the state and then having the state deny the refund request."2 In
this case, only the named plaintiffs in the class actually filed for a refund of
their corporate tax before they filed the lawsuit."3 The court therefore reasoned
that as to the other approximately 3100 members of the certified class, the State
of Arkansas had not waived its protections under sovereign immunity and the
court reversed the class certification." 4
The majority's strict construction as to the rules of sovereign immunity
was the subject of disagreement in Justice Brown's dissent.' Justice Brown
viewed the use of a class action lawsuit as the only practical means for
challenging such a tax." 6 The amount at stake for each of the member
corporations of the class is not enough to justify challenging the tax through the
administrative and judicial procedures.' '7 Justice Brown also reasoned that the
State of Arkansas, 1991-1993).
106. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 314, 947 S.W.2d at 776 (citing Leathers v. Active Realty Inc.,
317 Ark. 214, 876 S.W.2d 583 (1994)).
107. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 314, 947 S.W.2d at 776. The court interpreted the Act in
agreement with the taxpayers' contention in requiring payment of a graduated percentage tax
on income up to $100,000 and a flat 6.5% only on that portion of income above $100,000. See
id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. "The State of Arkansas shall never be a defendant in any of her courts." ARK.
CONST. ART. V, § 20.
111. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 314, 947 S.W.2d at 776.
112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-507 (Michie 1992).
113. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 315, 947 S.W.2d at 776.
114. See id.
115. See id. (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
116. See id. (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
117. See id. (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Plaintiffs estimated that each
individual member corporation within the class had approximately $1,060 at risk in the
litigation. See id. (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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majority's decision to deny class certification gives the State every reason to
take the most aggressive position against the taxpayer since they are unlikely
to meet any resistance.ll8
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The decision the majority reached in ACW, Inc. v. Weiss"' effectively
eliminates the class action lawsuit as a possibility in most taxpayer refund
suits. 20 By requiring strict compliance with the refund requirements by all of
the parties in the class to waive sovereign immunity, the court has eliminated
the only effective remedy in many cases.'2 1 Many tax refund disputes, like the
one in question in ACW, involve only a small amount at stake on behalf of each
taxpayer. 122 It is often not economically feasible to spend thousands of dollars
in court litigating a refund claim of only a few hundred dollars. 123 The class
action offers a solution to this problem by spreading the cost of litigating the
issue over the entire class. 1
24
While the court in ACW did not totally eliminate the availability of the
class action, it would be next to impossible to establish certification in most
cases. In ruling that any refund procedure which waives the State's sovereign
immunity is to be interpreted strictly, the court required that every taxpayer in
the class follow the refund procedures laid out in section 26-51-205 of the
Arkansas Code.' 25 In most cases, the taxpayer is likely to have no idea that the
tax is illegal, and therefore have no reason to file a refund claim. 126 Even after
the taxpayer files the refund claim, the State is simply going to deny the claim
based on the assumption that the tax in question is valid.
27
The court's decision to favor the protection of sovereign immunity over
the use of class actions is somewhat peculiar given the court's recent tendency
118. See id. (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "The bottom line is that the
State has every motivation to take the most aggressive stance on a given tax statute, for it is now
a virtual certainty that even the most extreme interpretation will reap the bounty of illegal tax
revenue." Id. at 315-16, 947 S.W.2d at 776. (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
119. 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997).
120. See id. at 314, 947 S.W.2d. at 776.
121. See id. at 316, 947 S.W.2d at 777 (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
122. See id. at 315, 947 S.W.2d at 776 (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123. See Braun & Dobie, supra note 83, at 914. See also ACW, 319 Ark. at 315, 947
S.W.2d at 776 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 316, 947 S.W.2d at 777 (Brown, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
125. See id. at 315, 947 S.W.2d at 776.
126. See State Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Staton, 325 Ark. 341, 354, 942 S.W.2d 804, 815
(1996) (Brown, J., dissenting).
127. See id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
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to broaden the application of the class action lawsuit.128 Most class action
refund suits, like the one in ACW, fit the class action requirements perfectly
since they normally involve a large number of plaintiffs who are all concerned
with the same legal question. The majority in ACW obviously felt that
protecting the taxpayer's financial interest was not as important as protecting
the State's coffers from potentially large class action claims. 12 9 With such a
major financial interest at stake for both the taxpayers as well as the State of
Arkansas, it may be time for the legislature to consider making some changes
to the present tax refund law. Since the present statute does not determine
whether class actions are appropriate for tax refund suits, all interpretation of
the law and the intent of the legislature has been left in the hands of the courts.
In conclusion, it is important to note that three justices favored allowing
the class action to proceed where only the named plaintiffs followed the refund
procedures. 30 Thus, with a change in composition, the court might reverse
itself if given the opportunity. History and past precedents would indicate this
is possible since the Arkansas Supreme Court has already done so one time on
this issue with the reversal of Pledger v. Bosnick3' in this case.
Joey Nichols
128. See Gould, supra note 33, at I.
129. See ACW, 329 Ark. at 315, 947 S.W.2d at 776 (Brown, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
130. See id. Justices Brown, Newbern, and Glaze all dissented on the issue of whether the
State's tax refund procedures require every taxpayer to comply with refund procedures before
sovereign immunity can be waived by the State to allow a class action refund suit. See id.
(Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); See also id. at 316, 947 S.W.2d at 777
(Glaze, J., dissenting).
131. 306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d 286 (1991).
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